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The Status of State Antitrust Laws
with Federal Analysis
John J. Hanson and Julian 0. von Kalinowski
The recent submission to the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws of a First Tentative Draft of a uniform state
antitrust act is indicative of a growing interest in the enactment and
enforcement of state antitrust laws.1
Another example of this renewed interest is shown by the legislative
and enforcement activity in California in the past few years. As late
as 1949, the California Cartwright Act had been referred to as the
"Sleeping Beauty."'2 This is no
longer true.' Other states haveTuE AUTHORS, JOHN" 3. HANSON (B.A.., MiS- hdsmlreptecs a
sissippi College, LL.B., University of Virginia) had similar experiences. Ha-
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University of Denver, LLB., Harvard Univer- have enacted new antitrust
sity) are practicing attorneys in Los Angeles,
California. They have contributed articles on laws. Wisconsin, New York,
antitrust law to numerous legal periodicals, and Texas have increased anti-
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trust enforcement."
The purpose of this article
is to analyze the trends in the
state antitrust field as com-
pared to federal law. In so
doing the authors shall review
the state decisions, with par-
ticular emphasis on those ac-
tivities which have been the
frequent target of antitrust en-
forcement. Analysis has been focused on the states of California, Ohio,
New York, Wisconsin, and Texas. The antitrust laws of these states
1. See 5 TRADB REG. REP. 5 50199. For another proposed uniform law, see Stenn, A Pro.
posed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text and Commentary On a Draft Statute, 39 TEXAs L.
REV. 717 (1961).
2. See von Kalinowski & Hanson, The Cartwright Act - California Sleeping Beauty, 2
STAN. L REV. 200 (1949). In 1.949 there were only three reported cases in which this law
had been invoked by the state, and the latest of these was in 1919. Id. at 201.
3. In 1959 the California Attorney General established what might be called a "formal"
antitrust division. Since that time there have been up to eight lawyers in the Attorney Gen-
eral's office who have devoted a substantial portion of their time to antitrust matters. There
are two offices, one in San Francisco and one in Los Angeles. Some of these lawyers also
handle what might be deemed "consumer fraud" cases. Hence, it is somewhat difficult to
determine the exact amount of manpower being used in antitrust enforcement.
Since March of 1960, the state has instituted ten proceedings alleging violations of the
Cartwright Act, eight of which were civil and two of which were criminal. In one of the
criminal cases, all of the defendants, except one, pleaded guilty, and fines totaling $40,000
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appear to be representative of the laws of the some forty states which
have general antitrust laws. In addition, these states appear to be among
those most active in antitrust enforcement.'
After analyzing the trends, the authors shall comment briefly as
to whether there is a need for a uniform act.
THE APPLICABLE STATUTES
The first state antitrust statute was passed by Kansas on March 30,
1889, and similar Texas legislation followed shortly thereafter in 1889.6
were imposed. The other criminal case is pending. In the eight civil cases, all or some of
the defendants entered into consent decrees generally similar to the federal consent decree.
One of the cases (involving a bid depository) was tried, and the court found a violation of
the law. The state has appealed because it feels the relief granted by the trial court was
inadequate. No decision apparently has been rendered in the balance of the civil case.
Most of the cases filed by the state so far involve allegations of price fixing, allocation of
customers, or group boycotts. Most of the cases, directly or indirectly, involve sales of prod-
ucts or services to governmental bodies from the following industries: utensils, ceramic tile,
real estate brokers, liquid chlorine, concrete blocks, furnishing of testing services, locks, other
finished hardware, flowers, and bowling alleys.
There have been several legislative changes since 1959, including the following: injured
private parties are entitled to recover treble damages, rather than double damages, and are
also entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE S 16750. This
section was also amended in 1961 to permit the state, as well as private persons, to bring
treble damage actions. The legislature in 1961 also added an exclusive dealing section gen-
erally similar to § 3 of the Clayton Act. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16712.
4. For a good recent summary of the activity of many of the states with respect to antitrust
enforcement, see Dealy, The Present Revival and Future Course of State Antitrust Enforcement,
38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 575 (1963).
5. Some of the more recent literature dealing with state antitrust laws includes the following:
General: U. S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, WORKS PROGRESS ADMIN., MARKETING LAWS SUR-
VEY, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS (1940), (a compilation of the antitrust laws and related
statutes of all of the states, including brief descriptions of the decisions interpreting these
laws); Mantzoras, Federal - State Antitrust Jurisdiction, 9 N.Y.L.F. 74 (1963); Pollock,
Federal Preemption and State Antitrust Enforcement, 43 CHICAGO B. RECORD 145 (1961);
Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 753 (1961); Sieker,
State of Federal Relations in Antitrust Cases - Many Questions and Few Answers, 9 N.Y.L.F.
199 (1963); Sieker, The Role of the States in Antitrust Law Enforcement - Some Views and
Observations, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 873 (1961); Wilson, The State Antitrust Laws, 47 A.B.A.J.
160 (1961); Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLuM. L.
REv. 1469 (1961).
California: Mosk, State Antitrust Enforcement in Coordination with Federal Enforcement,
21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 359 (1962), von Kalinowski and Hanson, The Cali-
fornia Antitrust Laws: A Comparison With the Federal Antitrust Laws, 6. U.C.L.A.L. REv.
533 (1959).
New York: N.Y.S.B.A., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE NEw
YORK ANTITRUST LAWS (1957); WILCOX, A REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON NEw YORK
ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOsIUM 186 (1959).
Ohio: Note, A Survey of Ohio Trade Regulation - A Comparison with Federal Trade
Regulation - A Recommendation, 25 U. CINC. L. REV. 475 (1956).
Texas: Moody & Wallace, Texas Antitrust Laws and Their Enforcement - Comparison
With Federal Antitrust Laws, 11 Sw. L.J. 1 (1957), 9 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 100
(1956).
Wisconsin: Geffen, Antitrust Law in Visconsin - Historical Development, 1951 WIS.
L. REV. 657.
6. For a brief summary of the background of the passage of the early state antitrust laws
see Wilson, The State Antitrust Laws, 47 A.B.A.J. 160 (1961). Wilson indicates that a
Texas legislative committee was among the first to propose a state antitrust statute.
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The key provision of the 1889 Texas statute was section 1 which de-
fined a trust as
a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons, firms,
corporations, or associations of persons, or of either two or more of
them, for either, any, or all of the following purposes: First, to create
or carry out restrictions in trade; second, to limit or reduce the produc-
tion, or increase or reduce the price, of merchandise or commodities... ;
fifth, to make or enter into or execute or carry out any contract, obliga-
tion, or agreement of any kind or description by which they shall bind
or have bound themselves not to sell, dispose of, or transport any article
or commodity, or article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce, or con-
sumption below a common standard figure, or by which they shall agree
in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity, or trans-
portation at a fixed or graduated figure, or by which they shall in any
manner establish or settle the price of any article or commodity or trans-
portation between them or themselves and others to preclude a free and
unrestricted competition among themselves or others in the sale or
transportation of any such article or commodity, or by which they shall
agree to pool, combine, or unite any interest they may have in con-
nection with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity
that its price might in any manner be affected.7
The Texas antitrust laws have been amended many times, but the
present statute is still similar to the 1889 act."
The key provision of the California Cartwright Act, originally passed
in 1907, is substantially the same as the above quoted provisions of the
Texas act.'
The key provision of the Ohio antitrust law, the Valentine Act, is
also generally similar to the original Texas and California statutes."
The basic provisions of the New York law read as follows:
1. Every contract, agreement, arrangement or combination whereby
A monopoly in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or
in the furnishing of any service in this state, is or may be established
or maintained, or whereby
Competition or the free exercise of any activity in the conduct of
any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service
in this state is or may be restrained or whereby
For the purpose of establishing or maintaining any such monopoly
or unlawfully interfering with the free exercise of any activity in the
conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of
any service in this state any business, trade or commerce or the furnish-
ing of any service is or may be restrained, is hereby declared to be
against public policy, illegal and void."
The key provision of the Wisconsin statute provides:
7. Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 22 S.W. 1048 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893). This case, quoting the
statute in its entirety, refers to it as the March 30, 1889 'Trust Act."
8. TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. art. 7426 (1960); TEx. PEN. CODE art. 1632 (1953).
9. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CoDE § 16720.
10. See Omo Rnv. ConE § 1331.01.
11. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw, § 340.
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(1) Every contract or combination in the nature of a trust or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is hereby declared illegal.
Every combination, conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement or contract in-
tended to restrain or prevent competition in the supply or price of any
article or commodity in general use in this state, to be produced or
sold therein or constituting a subject of trade or commerce therein, or
which combination, conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement or contract shall
in any manner control the price of any such article or commodity, fix
the price thereof, limit or fix the amount or quantity thereof to be
manufactured, mined, produced or sold in this state, or fix any stand-
ard or figure in which its price to the public shall be in any manner con-
trolled or established, is hereby declared an illegal restraint of trade.12
Many of the state antitrust statutes now in force are generally
similar to the original Texas act. Included in this group of states are
Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, North Dakota, and Virginia."
The key provisions of the Sherman Act were enacted in 1890 and
have not been changed since. Section I provides simply:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . ... 14
Section 2 states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce ... shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor .... 15
The legislative history of the Sherman Act is a long story.'" One
point, however, is worthy of mention here. One of the first antitrust
bills in Congress was introduced by Senator Reagan of Texas in August
1888 and again in December 1889. The key provision of Senator Rea-
gan's bill is strikingly similar to the 1889 Texas act.' 7 Thus, although
the provisions of the many state antitrust laws vary considerably, it seems
safe to say that their general purpose is the same as that of the federal
antitrust laws. This is confirmed by the fact that many of the state
statutes, including those of Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, and Wash-
ington, have provisions incorporating the language of Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act.' s Based on the review of the cases discussed
12. WIS. STAT. § 133.01 (Supp. 1963). The original 1893 act was almost identical to
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. See Letivin, Antitrust Law in Wisconsin - Historical
Development, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 657.
13. See 4 TRADE REG. REP. §§ 30000-530.
14. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
15. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
16. For one version of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, see THORELLI, THE FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST POLICY - ORIGINATION OF AN AMERIcAN TRADITION 156-232 (1955).
17. See Thorelli, supra note 16, at 169, 175.
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below, it seems that, as a general rule, the precise wording of the state
antitrust statutes has not been a significant factor in determining the
outcome of cases.
THE PERSUASIVENESS OF FEDERAL
DECISIONS AND STATE ANTITRUST CASES
Some of the states have found federal decisions most persuasive in
interpreting state acts. Many California cases have stated that the Cart-
wright Act merely articulates in greater detail the common law regulat-
ing restraints of trade; that the Sherman Act is basically a codification
of the common law; and that federal cases, accordingly, are persuasive in
determining the meaning of the Cartwright Act. 9  The most recent
judicial expression of this reliance on federal law by the California courts
is found in Shasta Douglas Oil Co. v. Work, where the court stated: "It
is well settled that [federal decisions] are authoritative in cases under
the Cartwright Act"2" Courts in other states also have relied on federal
cases in determining the legality of conduct under their state statutes.2 '
THE RULE OF REASON IN STATE ANTITRUST LAW
Although section 1 of the Sherman Act states that every restraint
of trade is unlawful, the United States Supreme Court has long held
that only unreasonable restraints of trade are illegal.m Certain activities
by reason of their nature or character are conclusively presumed to be
18. See 3 TRADE REG. REP. 5g 30801 (Colo.), 31502 (Idaho), 32102 (La.), 32202 (Me.),
and 35203 (Wash.).
19. Peo~le v. Building Maintenance Contractor's Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 719, 264 P.2d 31 (1953);
Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172 P.2d 867 (1946); A.B.C. Dis-
tributing Co. v. Distillers Distributing Corp., 154 Cal. App. 2d 175, 316 P.2d 71 (1957);
Milton v. Hudson Sales Corp. 152 Cal. App. 2d 418, 313 P.2d 936 (1957); Rolley, Inc. v.
Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 2d 844, 278 P.2d 63 (1954).
20. 212 Cal. App. 2d 640 (1963).
21. See, e.g., Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis. 604, 147 N.W.
1058 (1914) (with respect to the 1893 Wisconsin Act); Manhattan Storage & Warehouse Co.
v. Movers & Warehouse Ass'n, 262 App. Div., 28 N.Y.S.2d 594, 597 (1941) ("great weight
should be given").
22. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). See also Handler, The Judicial Architects of the Rule of
Reason, 10 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEctiON REP. 21 (1957); Montague, Per Se Illegality on the
Rule of Reason, 12 A.B.A. ANrusr SECrxoN REP. 69 (1958). The classic statement ap-
pears in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918): "Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very es-
sence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the pur-
pose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts."
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unreasonable restraints of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act
and are deemed illegal per se.'
Many of the states have applied the "rule of reason" test. California
courts have stated that the broad prohibitions of the Cartwright Act "are
subject to an implied exception similar to the one which validates reason-
able restraints of trade under the Federal Sherman Antitrust Act."24
The key provision of the New York antitrust statute, though not
phrased in terms of the Sherman Act, is also general and broad. If the
statute were to be interpreted literally, nearly every contract would be
found to be an illegal restraint. The New York courts have recognized
this and have consistently held that reasonable restraints of trade are
legal.25 Similarly, an Ohio court stated that "contracts in restraint of
trade are not illegal except where unreasonable in character,""6 and a
Wisconsin court has indicated that the rule of reason, as developed in
the federal cases, is applicable in applying its statute.2
It is unclear whether the Texas courts purport to apply the rule of
reason test. One writer noted that while the statement is occasionally
made that "Texas professes to have no rule of reason - the courts in
fact have given the Texas antitrust statutes a 'reasonable interpreta-
tion.' Subsequent decisions, however, indicate rejection of the rule
of reason.2"
In summary, it seems likely that, in enforcing the state antitrust
laws, most state courts will apply the rule of reason in appropriate cases.
Failure to do so could result in declaring many normal and legitimate
business arrangements illegal.
PRICE FIXING
Although there may be some question as to what activity consti-
tutes price fixing" it is clear that agreements which fix prices are
23. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1956), the court noted that price
fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements are practices which the
courts have "heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves."
24. People v. Building Maintenance Contractors Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 719, 727, 264 P.2d 31,
36 (1958). Similar statements appear in Milton v. Hudson Sales Corp., 152 Cal. App. 2d
418, 313 P.2d 936 (1957) and Elliott v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., TRADE REG. REP.
(1959 Trade Cas.) 5 69247, at 74943 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1959).
25. See, e.g., Simons v. Fried, 302 N.Y. 323, 98 N.E.2d 456 (1951); New York Bank
Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Engraving & Printing Co., 180 N.Y. 280, 73 N.E. 48
(1905); Cole Steel Equip. Co. v. Art Lloyd Metal Prods. Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 148; 148
N.Y.S.2d 440, reversing 144 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
26. List v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-op. Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. 361, 151 N.E. 471 (1926).
27. State v. Lewis & Leidersdorf Co., 201 Wis. 543, 230 N.W. 692 (1930).
28. Moody, Texas Antitrust Laws and Their Enforcement With Some Preference to Federal
Antitrust Laws, 9 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcroN REP. 106, 107 (1956).
29. Climatic Air Distrib. v. Climatic Air Sales Inc., 162 Tex. 237, 345 S.W.2d 702 (1961);
Grand Prize Distrib. Co. v. Gulf Brewing Co., 267 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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illegal per se under the federal antitrust laws.3 States also have given
attention to this activity in that there are provisions in most state statutes
which specifically outlaw price fixing. Discussed below are some of the
cases decided by the courts of five of these states.
California
Prior to the enactment of the Cartwright Act in 1907, price fixing
agreements between competitors were illegal if most or all of the mem-
bers of the industry affected were parties to the agreement?' However,
in the case of Herriman v. Menzies,3 a price fixing agreement entered
into by a few members of an industry was held to be legal because
there was no showing that the prices fixed were unreasonable or that
there had been any interference with the freedom of others to engage in
the business.
The cases decided since the enactment of the Cartwright Act have
held uniformly that price fixing by competitors dominating the industry
is illegal.34 It is not dear, however, whether price fixing is illegal re-
gardless of the absence of market control. The court in People v. Build-
ing Mainenance Contractor's Ass'n,3" considered a conspiracy to fix prices
entered into by ninety per cent of the industry involved. In holding the
conduct illegal under the Cartwright Act, the court stated that the
Herriman case was "no longer controlling" because it was decided prior
to the Cartwright Act. The court also distinguished Herriman on the
ground that the defendants in the Building Maintenance case controlled
ninety per cent of the industry, while the defendants in Herriman con-
stituted only a few members of the industry.3 '
New York
With regard to price fixing, the New York courts have found them-
selves in a dilemma. This dilemma is caused by the legislature's sanc-
tioning of vertical price fixing arrangements between manufacturers and
retailers while at the same time invalidating price fixing arrangements
on the horizontal level between retailers themselves or among manu-
facturers. Thus, in Port Chester Wine & Liquor Shop v. Miller Bros.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
32. See Vulcan Powder v. Hercules Powder Co., 95 Cal. 510, 31 Pac. 581 (1892).
33. 115 Cal. 16, 46 Pac. 730 (1896).
34. See People v. Building Maintenance Contractor's Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 719, 264 P.2d 31
(1953); People v. H. Jevne Co., 179 Cal. 621, 178 Pac. 517 (1919).
35. Supra note 34.
36. Id. at 728, 264 P.2d at 37. If the Cartwright Act "merely articulates in greater detail'
the common law rules (see cases at note 19 supra), it is difficult to see why the Herrimran case,
even though decided prior to the Cartwright Act, would be "no longer controlling."
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Fruiterers, Inc.,3 the court permitted a retailer to seek redress against
a competing retailer for violation of a vertical price fixing arrangement
made with a manufacturer under the New York Fair Trade Act."8 The
ultimate effect of this decision was to allow retailers to compel other re-
tailers to maintain fixed price arrangements even though they cannot
initially enter such arrangements.
In John D. Park & Sons Co. v. National W. Druggists Ass'n, 9 an
organization of retail druggists formed an association which petitioned
manufacturers to adopt a plan whereby all members of the retail associa-
tion would agree to purchase from the manufacturers at one stipulated
price and then sell at another stipulated price. The court held that the
plan was not a restraint of trade, as the manufacturers themselves could
require said prices. In essence the plan was the creation of an agency
relationship in which every druggist throughout the United States might
receive and dispose of goods as the agent of the principal and receive
a commission. It should be noted, however, that the retailers them-
selves solicited and achieved the price requirements from the manu-
facturers. However, in Pleaters, Stitchers & Embroiderers Ass'n v. Jaffe
Pleating Co.," a membership corporation filed suit against one of its
members to recover a fine imposed for selling services at a lesser price
than that stipulated in the "basic minimum cost schedule" published by
the association. The defendant declared that the basic minimum cost
schedule was in contravention of section 340 of the General Business
Law. The court found for the defendant, stating that the basic cost
schedule was a restraint of trade and interfered with the free activity of
determining the price of services to be furnished by the association's
members. The same result was reached in Cline v. Consumers Co-op
Gas & Oil Co.,4 wherein the plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain
the defendant from selling gas at a price lower than that allowed by the
Code of Fair Competition for the oil industry, which was issued pursuant
to the National Industrial Recovery Act. After holding that the Presi-
dent of the United States could not gain authority over intrastate com-
merce, the court then found that the plaintiff and defendant were re-
tailers engaged in intrastate commerce. The court concluded that to
allow the organization to restrain the defendant from selling at a lower
price than that posted would be dearly in contravention of section 340
of the General Business Law.
37. 253 App. Div. 188, 1 N.Y.S.2d 802, reversing 253 Misc. 188, 1 N.Y.S.2d 336 (Sup.
Ct. 1938).
38. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 369a-e.
39. 175 N.Y. 1, 67 N.E. 136 (1903).
40. 176 Misc. 411, 27 N.Y.S.2d 615 (New York City Munic. Ct. 1941).
41. 162 Misc. 653, 274 N.Y. Supp. 362 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
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In Marsich v. Eastman Kodak Co.,42 however, a contract was made
between an intrastate producer and a group of dealers, calling for the
maintenance of a price scale on the producers products. The agreement
also prohibited the dealers from selling to anyone who violated the
price scale or who in turn sold to one who violated the price scale. The
court held that this contract did not conflict with section 340. The
distinction is that while a manufacturer may require retailers to sell his
products for at least X price, he can not combine with other manu-
facturers to fix the price of goods at X price. This is the holding of
Straus v. The Am. Publishers Ass'n,4" where ninety-five per cent of the
book publishing industry organized to compel retailers to sell books at
prices fixed by the publishers. If the retailers failed to conform to the
agreement, the publishers would not supply them. The court found this
to be a violation of the act.
Ohio
An agreement between two competing companies to pay a specified
price for crude oil in a particular area was held illegal in an early Ohio
case." Other cases have held that an agreement between a seller and
a buyer specifying the price at which the buyer would resell is illegal.45
The case of Clover Meadow Creamery v. National Dairy Creamery6
is worthy of note in that the court indicated that a restraint was illegal
because of the effect it had on prices. In this case, an organization of
milk distributors had adopted a plan whereby retailers would be able to
obtain milk bottles free of charge instead of paying the normal deposit.
While such action looked innocent without reference to any other cir-
cumstances, the evidence revealed that the association by such tactics
would cause the ruination of many distributors who could not afford to
sell milk at a reasonable price without requesting a deposit for the
bottles. The court felt that the organization was attempting to drive
these people out of business and was willing to lose money itself in order
to accomplish its end. The court noted that persons in business have a
right to join organizations to promote the interests of its members and
to discuss pricing problems, but went on to hold that they do not have
the right to restrain trade unreasonably. The public is prejudiced when
such an organization adopts, as a coercive weapon, business methods
42. 244 App. Div. 295, 279 N.Y. Supp. 140 (1934), aff'd, 269 N.Y. 621, 200 N.E. 27
(1936).
43. 85 App. Div. 446, 83 N.Y. Supp. 271 (1903), affd, 177 N.Y. 473, 69 NE. 1107
(1904).
44. Gates v. Standard Oil Co., 51 Week L Bull. 563 (Ohio P. Ct. 1906).
45. McCall v. ONeill, 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 17 (C.P. 1914); Freeman v. Miller, 9 Ohio
N.P. (n.s.) 26 (Super. Ct. 1909).
46. 29 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 243 (C.P. 1932).
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which have the inevitable effect of raising the cost of the commodity to
the distributor while unreasonably limiting or restricting competition.
The obvious effect of such an agreement would be to force an increase
in the price of the commodity to the consumer. Thus, although in-
volving an agreement relating to prices, this arrangement really was
found to be illegal as one involving a combination to drive a competitor
out of business.
Texas
Although there are numerous recorded cases in Texas involving the
state antitrust laws, there do not appear to be any clear cut cases involv-
ing price fixing agreements between competitors. Texas does not have a
state fair trade act, and resale price fixing agreements are illegal.47
Wisconsin
Price fixing has been held to be illegal in Wisconsin.4" In State v.
Golden Guernsey Dairy Co-op.,4" the court held that an agreement by
milk distributors to sell at specified prices and notify each other of any
prospective price changes was illegal.
Resale price maintenance was held to be illegal in a case decided be-
fore the advent of the fair trade laws." One case involved an associa-
tion of retail gasoline dealers which sent letters to dealers asking that
prices remain stable. Personal visits were made to see that the prices
charged were in accord with the desires of the association. The court
found an illegal agreement.5
REFUSALS TO DEAL AND GROUP BOYCOTTS
An agreement between a group of competitors not to deal with a
third person is a group or combination boycott and has long been con-
demned as an unreasonable restraint in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. In a recent case, the Supreme Court stated:
47. Ford Motor Co. v. State, 175 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex. 1943); Segal v. McCall Co., 108
Tex. 55, 184 S.W. 188 (1916); Marathon Oil Co. v. Hadley, 107 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1935); Dickerson v. McConnon & Co., 248 S.W. 1084, 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923);
W. T. Raleigh Co. v. Lemon, 247 S.W. 683, 684-85 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); W. T. Raleigh
Medical Co., 184 S.W. 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
48. The Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin has stated that most antitrust cases involve
price fixing violations. He lists as a sample of Wisconsin prosecutions cases involving price
fixing in the following enterprises: retail gasoline, dairies, contractors, typewriter manufac-
turers, a labor union, undertakers, bakers, and chemical companies. He also states that all of
these cases resulted in judgments for the state. Sieker, The Role of the States in Antitrust
Law Enforcement - Some Views and Observations, 39 TExAs L. REV. 873, 878 (1961).
49. 257 Wis. 254, 43 N.W.2d 31 (1950).
50. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lang, 186 Wis. 530, 203 N.W. 399 (1925).
51. State v. Retail Gasoline Dealers Ass'n, 256 Wis. 537, 41 N.W.2d 637 (1949).
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Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other
traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category. They
have not been saved by allegations that they were'reasonable in the
specific circumstances, nor by a failure to show that traders fixed or
regulated prices, parcelled out or limited production, or brought about
a deterioration in quality ... .2
A refusal to deal by an individual businessman does not violate
section I of the Sherman Act because the element of a combination
or conspiracy is absent."3 The act requires two or, more persons to enter
into an agreement or understanding.54 An individual refusal to deal,
however, may constitute an attempt to monopolize or actual monopoliza-
tion in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act For example, in
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,5 the Court held that section 2
was violated when a newspaper, as part of a pattern designed to stifle
competition, refused to carry advertising by persons who used a compet-
ing radio station.
California
In general, the federal rules apply in California. An individual.
refusal to deal is not by itself illegal.56  The California courts have em-
phasized that a seller ordinarily hds the right to sell his goods 'to whom-
ever he pleases and to refuse to sell to particular persons.57 Since Cali_
fornia has no statute comparable to section 2 of the Sherrhai Act, it
is difficult to see how any individual refusal td deal cold 'violate the
Cartwright Act. Group refusals to deal, however, probably, are illegal,'
at least where they are part of a plan to control an industry."5
New York
There has been a substantial amount of litigation, in New York re-
garding refusals to deal. The law in this state is well established that in-
dividual refusals to deal are not illegal.5" An individual refusal to sell
52. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (19.59).
53. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
54. See ATr'Y GEN. NAY'L COMM. ANrnusr REP. 30-36 (1955) for a discussion of the
problems involved in determining if two or more persons are present within 'the meaning of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. A corporation and its officers cannot conspire in restraint
of trade within the meaning of section 1. See, e.g., Nelson Radio & Supply Co, v. Motorola
Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952). More difficult problems are involved, however,
when the charge is a conspiracy between a parent and its subsidiary or between two corpora-
tions, the stock of which is owned by the same natural persons.
55. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
56. A.B.C. Distrib. Co. v. Distillers Distrib. Corp., 154 Cal. App. 2d 175, 316 P.2d 71
(1957); Munter v. Eastman Kodak Co., 28 Cal. App. 660, 153 Pac. 737 (1915).
57. Munter v. Eastman Kodak Co., supra at 667-69, 153 Pac. at 740-41 (1915).
58. Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172 P.2d 867 (1946).
59. Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 195 N.Y. 565, 88 NE. 287 (1909); Dior v. Milton,
9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. C), aft'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 882, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996
(1956).
4
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is legal even though it is the result of "mere caprice, prejudice or malice,"
since it is not within the power of the courts to compel an owner of prop-
erty to sell it "without his consent and against his wishes, to any particu-
lar person.""0
In one case, Locker v. American Tobacco Co.,6 it was held that an
individual refusal to sell is legal even though the seller controls substan-
tially the whole production or output of a staple produce. Here the
court held that the seller could not be deprived of that right "simply be-
cause of the magnitude of his business or his wealth." 2
The New York cases also make it clear, however, that a concerted
refusal to sell by a group of competitors is illegal under the New York
antitrust laws. 3 But a group boycott or a conspiracy to refuse to sell
cannot be established merely by claiming that a single manufacturer and
his employees refused to sell to the plaintiff. In rejecting a claim that
such a "conspiracy" was illegal, the court stated that the act was aimed
at agreements between different manufacturers or merchants engaged in
a particular business.64 The case of Alexander's Dep't Stores v. Ohr-
bach's"5 presented an interesting question. Ohrbach's and Alexander's
were two competing retail stores and were both long time customers of
the defendant manufacturer. Ohrbach's finally convinced the manu-
facturer to cease selling a certain product to Alexander's and to sell it
exclusively to Ohrbach's. The court held that the agreement was illegal,
and stated that Ohrbach's could not use its superior buying power to
eliminate a competitor in this manner.6
Texas
Article 7428 of Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes expressly provides that
an agreement by two or more persons to refuse to buy or sell to any other
person is a conspiracy in restraint of trade. In Griff in v. Palatine Ins.
Co.," it was held that an agreement of a group of insurance companies
60. Lepler v. Palmer, 150 Misc. 546, 550, 270 N.Y. Supp. 440, 444 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
61. 195 N.Y. 565, 88 N.E. 289 (1909).
62. Id. at 566, 88 N.E. at 289.
63. Bertini v. Murray, 262 App. Div. 893, 28 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1941), affd, 290 N.Y. 754,
50 N.E.2d 98 (1943); Straus v. American Publishers Assn., 85 App. Div. 446; 83 N.Y.
Supp. 271, aff'd, 177 N.Y. 473, 69 N.E. 107 (1904); Finnegan v. Butler, 112 Misc. 280,
182 N.Y. Supp. 671 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Sultan v. Starr Co., 106 Misc. 43, 174 N.Y. Supp. 52
(Sup. Ct. 1919).
64. Light Corrugated Box Corp. v. South Craft Corp., 20 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
65. 266 App. Div. 535, 42 N.Y.S.2d 703, reversing 180 Misc. 18, 40 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup.
Ct. 1943).
66. For a contrary holding in federal cases involving a somewhat similar factual situation,
see Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Co., 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956).
67. 238 S.W. 637 (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1922).
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not to insure a certain person was illegal. The Texas courts have held,
however, that an individual manufacturer may refuse to sell to any
person.6"
Ohio
No Ohio cases specifically dealing with individual or group refusals
to sell were found.
Ilisconsin
There appears to be little authority in Wisconsin regarding refusals
to sell, either individual or group. In State v. P. Lorillard Co.,6 the
court held an arrangement between tobacco manufacturers and jobbers
illegal. The arrangement involved a conspiracy to regulate prices and to
refuse to sell to those who would not maintain the prices.
EXCLUSIVE DEALING CONTRACTS
The usual exclusive dealing contract requires the purchaser to buy all
of his needs from the seller, with the result that the purchaser cannot deal
with the seller's competitors. Under the federal antitrust laws, exclusive
dealing and tie-in agreements generally are governed by section 3 of
the Clayton Act,7" which makes such contracts illegal where the effect
"may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly."
The principle issue in federal cases involving section 3 is whether the
agreements have the requisite anti-competitive effect. Numerous tests
have been suggested, but all of them involve an element of "substanti-
ality."'"
Except for the recent California statute noted below, none of the five
states have a statute comparable to section 3 of the Clayton Act.
Texas
The treatment of exclusive dealing contracts has an interesting history
in Texas. Article 7428 of the Texas Civil Statutes proirides that it is il-
legal for two persons who engage in selling any commodity to refuse to
68. Ford Motor Co. v. State, 142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W.2d 230 (1943); Jax Beer Co. v. Palmer,
150 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
69. 181 Wis. 347, 193 N.W. 613 (1923).
70. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1914). Such contracts may violate § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, see Federal Tra-le Comm'n v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv.,
344 U.S. 392 (1953), or § I of the Sherman Act, see Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
u.s. 1 (1958).
71. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365"U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
19631
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
sell to any other person.72 In an early case, Wood v. Texas Ice & Cold
Storage,3 the court held illegal under article 7428 a contract that re-
quired the buyer to purchase all of his requirements of ice from the seller.
There was no showing of a lessening of competition or any undue re-
straint of trade. Thus, the court in this case outlawed all requirements
contracts regardless of effect so long as the buyer expressly or impliedly
agreed not to handle the competing products. 4
In Cox v. Humble Oil and Ref. Co., 5 the above rules were modified
in a significant way. In this case, a retail gasoline dealer agreed to pur-
chase from one seller all of the gas used by him at his filling station. The
court held the agreement to be legal, finding the Wood case distinguish-
able. The court stated that the buyer in Wood agreed to buy all of the
ice needed from the seller; in the Cox case, the court stated that the buyer
agreed to purchase all of his requirements needed at the filling station,
but the buyer was free to purchase gas from others for other uses. This
was deemed to be a limited restraint and hence valid.7" In Jones Inv.
Co. v. The Great Atl. & Pac. Co.,7 7 the Texas courts demonstrated how
far they will go to import the concept of limiting restraints into a case to
save a requirements contract. In the A. & P. case, the court held that a
contract to purchase all of a commodity needed in a chain of grocery
stores was not a general restraint because the buyer could purchase from
someone else for stores built in the future or for stores not covered by the
contract. A Texas court has applied the same distinction to a contract in
which the seller agreed to sell all of the products produced at the seller's
plant to one buyer.78
State v. Fairbanks-Morse & Co.79 was decided shortly thereafter. In
this case, the state contended in effect that an agreement whereby a buyer
72. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat art. 7428 (1960) provides in part:
"'Either or any of the following acts shall constitute a conspiracy in restraint of trade:
"l. Where any two or more persons, firms, corporations or associations of persons, who
are engaged in buying or selling any article of merchandise, produce or any commodity, enter
into an agreement or understanding to refuse to buy from or sell to any other person, firm,
corporation or association of persons, any article of merchandise, produce or commodity.
"2. Where any two or more persons, firms, corporations or associations of persons, shall
agree to boycott or threaten to refuse to buy from or sell to any person, firm, corporation or
association of persons for buying from or selling to any other person, firm, corporation or
association of persons."
73. 171 S.W. 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
74. Wright v. Southern Ice Co., 144 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
75. 16 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1929).
76. See to the same effect Padgitt v. Loan Star Gas Co., 213 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948), and City of Crosbyton v. Texas-New Mexico Util. Co., 157 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942).
77. 65 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1933).
78. Portland Gasoline Co. v. Superior Mkting. Co., 243 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. 1951). An
agreement to buy all the butane-protane mixture produced at the seller's plant (but only at
that plant) was a "limited" restraint and not illegal.
79. 246 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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(a consumer) would purchase all of its requirements of certain products
from one seller was illegal. The state relied on the Wood case, but the
court stated that it has been "severely limited if not actually overruled '"
by the Cox decision and similar cases. In holding that the agreement was
not illegal, the court stated that it was not within the scope of article
7428 because that section requires two concerns "both of whom are en-
gaged in buying or selling.... ,,"
Thus, an exclusive dealing contract does not appear to be within the
scope of article 7428. The question of whether such a contract is within
the purview of some of the other provisions of the Texas antitrust laws
will not be treated in this article.
A more recent case, Turner v. Rhea,8" returned to a holding of il-
legality. In this case, the contract provided that the seller would sell a
number of chinchillas to the buyer, who agreed "not [to] offer for sale,
trade or exchange animals from sources" other than the seller. In hold-
ing the agreement to be illegal, the court noted that there was "no limi-
tation as to place or time, and... that appellant is by the contract for-
ever restricted... ." with respect to purchasing chinchillas from others.
The court concluded that the Fairbanks case was not controlling and de-
scribed that decision as holding that "no violation occurred when the
purchaser is the 'ultimate consumer' of the commodities sold.... ."84
The above cases indicate one of the rare instances in which form,
rather than substance, affects the outcome of an antitrust case. As a
practical matter, a "limited" restraint of the type referred to above is the
same as a general restraint. It may be that a limited restraint to be valid
can cover only stores or outlets owned by the buyer at the time of the
contract. If one were careful in drafting the contract and made sure that
he did not state that the buyer could not handle competing products, the
contract would be valid.
New York
The only New York case which appears to deal with arrangements
of the type covered by section 3 of the Clayton Act involved an agree-
ment whereby a landlord in a summer recreation area required his tenants
to purchase all supplies from him or other tenants in the area. 5 The
court held the agreement to be a reasonable way to protect the tenants in
this summer colony and upheld it.
80. Id. at 657.
81. Ibid.
82. 317 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
83. Id. at 231.
84. Ibid.
85. Dougherty v. Rockaway Operating Co., 163 Misc. 806, 298 N.Y. Supp. 242 (Sup. Ct.
1937).
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Ohio
One Ohio case upheld an agreement between a lessor and a lessee
whereby the latter agreed not to sell any beer on the leased premises other
than that which was made and sold by the lessor. 8
Wisconsin
A number of Wisconsin cases have considered exclusive dealing con-
tracts. An agreement by a retailer to purchase all of his ice cream and
other dairy products from one manufacturer was upheld in Wisconsin
Creameries, Inc. v. Johnson." A similar result was reached in cases in-
volving patterns and beer."8 However, where an exclusive dealing con-
tract is merely a part of an overall combination in restraint of trade, the
agreement is illegal if the combination is found to be illegal.89
California
There are a number of California cases which have considered the
legality of exclusive dealing contracts. All of these cases, however, were
decided prior to 1961 when California enacted a provision substantially
similar (except for commerce requirements) to section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act."0 But it is too early to tell exactly how this new provision
will be interpreted by the California courts. Prior to the enactment of
this statute, exclusive dealing contracts were held legal or illegal," de-
pending on the circumstances.
EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS
The federal antitrust cases clearly distinguish between exclusive deal-
ing and exclusive territorial contracts. Under the usual exclusive dealing
contract, the buyer agrees, expressly or impliedly, that he will not handle
products which are competitive with those obtained from the seller. The
86. Chris-Diehl Brewing Co. v. Konst, 79 Ohio St. 469, 87 N.E. 1137 (1905).
87. 208 Wis. 444, 243 N.W. 498 (1932).
88. Rose v. Gordon, 158 Wis. 414, 149 N.W. 158 (1914); Butterick Publishing Co. v.
Rose, 141 Wis. 533, 124 N.W. 647 (1910).
89. State v. Lewis & Leidersdorf Co., 201 Wis. 543, 230 N.W. 692 (1930); Pulp Wood
Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis. 604, 147 N.W. 1058 (1914) (appeal on de-
murrer), appeal on the merits, 168 Wis. 400, 170 N.W. 230 (1919). For a discussion of the
Wisconsin cases, see Clemons, The Full Supply Contract Under State and Federal Anti-trust
Laws, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 208.
90. CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE § 16723.
91. The following cases held such arrangements to be legal: Great W. Distillery Prods. Inc.
v. John A. Wathen Distillery Co., 10 Cal. 2d 442, 74 P.2d 745 (1947); Associated Oil Co.
v. Myers, 217 Cal. 297, 18 P.2d 668 (1933); Rolley Inc. v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc.,
129 Cal. App. 2d 844, 278 P.2d 63 (1954). Cases holding such arrangements illegal are:
Getz Bros. & Co. v. Federal Salt Co., 147 Cal. 115, 81 Pac. 416 (1905) (where the agree-
ment was apparently part of a plan to monopolize an industry); Coombs v. Burk, 40 Cal.
App. 8, 180 Pac. 59 (1919).
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legality of such contracts is usually determined under section 3 of the
Clayton Act. 2 In the usual exclusive territorial arrangement, the seller
agrees to sell only to the buyer in a specified territory and not to others
in the territory. Thus, the restraint is on the seller. In many cases, a
contract contains both restrictions. The legality of an exclusive territorial
arrangement generally is determined under the Sherman Act; it is not
within the scope of section 3 of the Clayton Act.
In the absence of power to control the market, an exclusive territorial
arrangement generally is held to be legal under California law.93 How-
ever, if the exclusive territorial arrangement is part of a plan to give a
person a monopoly in the area involved, and the parties have substantial
market control of the product, the arrangement is illegal in California."
The rules are similar under the federal antitrust laws. "5
There appear to be very few cases in New York, Ohio, or Wisconsin
involving this type of arrangement. One lower New York court upheld
such arrangement. In Revlon Prod. Corp. v. Bernstein,96 the manufac-
turer sold to retailers and jobbers under contracts limiting the jobbers
to a specific territory and limiting their right of resale to beauty parlors
and beauty schools. Defendant, a retailer, knowing of the contract, in-
duced the jobber to sell to him. Plaintiff sued for injunctive relief and
damages for inducing the breach of contract. The defendant moved to
dismiss on the grounds that the contract between the manufacturer and
jobber was an illegal restraint of trade. The motion was denied, the
court holding that a provision restricting a jobber to sell within allotted
territory does not restrain trade.
One Ohio court held such an arrangement to be legal. In Federal
Sanitation Co. v. Frankel,97 the contract granted exclusive selling rights
in two states and two cities in other states, and provided that the sales-
men should neither engage in other business nor aid any competitors'
business within the territory assigned for a period of twelve months after
the termination of his employment. The court, however, found no re-
straint of trade in this case. The contract, therefore, could be enforced
92. See page 21 supra. (Section re exclusive dealing contracts.)
93. Great W. Distillery Prods. Inc. v. John A. Wathen Distillery Co., 10 Cal. 2d 442, 74
P.2d 745 (1937); Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110, 27 Pac. 36 (1891); Schwalm
v. Holmes, 49 Cal. 665, 74 P.2d 748 (1875); Rolley, Inc. v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc.,
129 Cal. App. 2d 844, 278 P.2d 63 (1954).
94. Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727, 203 Pac. 760 (1922); Santa Clara Valley Mill &
Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387, 18 Pac. 391 (1888).
95. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 29 (1955). Compare White Motor Co.
v. United States 372 U.S. 253 (1963), which involved a specific agreement by the distributor
not to sell to persons outside the disputed territory.
96. 204 Misc. 80, 119 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
97. 34 Ohio App. 331, 171 N.E. 339 (1929).
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with an injunction so long as it was supported by sufficient consideration,
the terms were not oppressive, and the restraint was only partial.
No Wisconsin cases dealing with this subject were located.
Texas courts appear to have ruled on exclusive territorial agreements
more than any other type of arrangement, and they have uniformly held
such contracts to be illegal, regardless of the circumstances.
A 1919 case, American Brewing Ass'n v. Woods,9" involved an ex-
clusive distributorship arrangement for the city of Orange, Texas. There
had been a previous distributor for the Association in Orange, but he
was indebted to the group for $2400. Woods agreed to pay off the
debt, and in exchange the Association agreed to have him act as the
exclusive distributor in Orange. The size of the operation is indicated
by the fact that Woods had one wagon, one horse, and employed one
man. Woods sued to recover damages for breach of the agreement
when the Association started selling to another distributor. The parties
described Woods as an "agent," and most of the opinion was devoted
to the question of whether Woods was an agent or a distributor. After
concluding that Woods was not an agent, the court held the predeces-
sor section to article 7428 applicable and the agreement illegal, stating
that the transaction falls "literally within the language of the statute,"
and that the court is "not concerned with the policy of the law."99  Nu-
merous subsequent cases have reached the same result. 0
In Grand Prize Distrib. Co. v. Gulf Brewing Co.,10' a Texas court
again held such an arrangement (involving most of one county) illegal.
The appellant argued that the Woods case and other similar cases are no
longer applicable and, citing Cox v. Humble,"°2 urged that Texas now
follows the so-called 'rule of reason test' in restraint of trade cases. The
court rejected this contention, found the prior cases are squarely in point,
and stated it was the court's "plain duty to follow them."1 °
In the recent case of Climatic Air Distrib. v. Climatic Air Sales,
04
the Texas Supreme Court appears to have confirmed the old rule. Here
the seller argued again that the rule of reason should be applied. The
98. 215 S.W. 448 (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1919).
99. Id.at450-51.
100. Kelly v. Bryson Pipeline & Ref. Co., 163 S.W.2d 413, 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942);
Burpee Can Sealer Co. v. Henry McDonnell Co., 75 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934);
Tri-State Sales Co. v. National Automatic Mach. Co., 38 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931);
National Automatic Mach. Co. v. Smith, 32 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); J. R.
Watkins Co. v. McMullan, 6 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v.
Land, 261 S.W. 186, 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), aff'd, 279 S.W. 810 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926); J. R. Watkins Co. v. Myers, 255 S.W. 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); State v. Willys-
Overland, Inc., 211 S.W. 609, 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
101. 267 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
102. Cox v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 16 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1929).
103. Grand Prize Distrib. Co. v. Gulf Brewing Co., supra note 101, at 908.
104. 162 Tex. 237, 345 S.W.2d 702 (1961).
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court interpreted this to mean that evidence should be admitted to see
"whether in fact competition has been restricted." The court rejected
this argument by stating that it was overruled in the Grand Prize case
and that "we adhere to that decision."' 5
MERGERS
Mergers under federal law are governed primarily by amended sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act. The acquisition by one corporation of
the stock or assets of another corporation is illegal under this section
where the "effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly."'0 6  The general purpose of
section 7 is to prohibit mergers or acquisitions which are economically
significant and which may have a substantial adverse effect on competi-
tion. The legislative history shows that the purpose of amended section
7 was to "cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency, well
before they have attained such effects which would justify a Sherman
Act proceeding."'0 7  In short, the purpose is to "nip monopoly in the
bud."108
Both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
have challenged a number of mergers since the 1950 amendment. The
crucial but difficult issue in almost all of the merger cases is whether
the requisite adverse effect on competition results.
The recent United States Supreme Court decisions indicate that sec-
tion 7 is interpreted in such a manner as to prohibit a substantial num-
ber of mergers. 9
During the past ten years it seems clear that both the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have devoted a sub-
stantial part of their time and effort to merger cases. The states, on
the other hand, apparently have not brought any actions in the recent
past challenging the legality of mergers.
There apparently have been no Ohio or Wisconsin cases of any kind
involving the legality of a merger.
There are few California cases, however, which deal with this prob-
lem. The superior court in People v. American Sugar Ref. Co.,"' held
that the defendant violated the common law by combining with a
105. Id. at 243-44, 345 S.W.2d at 706.
106. 64 Star. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
107. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
108. United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
109. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); see Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
110. 7 RAILWAY & CORPORATION .J. 83 (1890). The California Supreme Court, how-
ever, reversed an order appointing a receiver of the property. Havemeyer v. Superior Court,
84 Cal. 327, 24 Pac. 121 (1890).
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"Sugar Trust" which controlled the major sugar companies in the
United States. The case of San Diego Water Co. v. Flume Co."' in-
volved the legality under common law of what was in substance a mer-
ger of a company which owned a supply of water near San Diego and
a company which owned a pumping plant and a system of mains and
pipes for the distribution of water in San Diego. The court held the
agreement legal because there was no injury to the public. The city
could protect the public by regulating water rates.
Article 7427 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes appears to be broad
enough to cover mergers where the effect "tends to affect or lessen com-
petition."
The court in San Antonio Gas Co. v. State"' held that a merger of
the gas and electric companies in San Antonio violated the Texas anti-
trust laws.
One early New York case held that the New York antitrust laws
are little more than a codification of the common law, and there is
nothing in them to affect or limit acquisitions of the stock of one cor-
poration by another."' Another New York case, however, in ruling
on a preliminary matter, held that the acquisition by one corporation of
the stock of another corporation for the purpose of creating a monopoly
would be illegal under the antitrust laws."'
SUMMARY OF NATURE OF STATE
ANTITRUST DECISIONS
The authors have not attempted to review all of the antitrust cases
in the five states nor have they considered each of the cases dealing with
the above discussed practices. However, a few generalizations might be
suggested:
1. As might be expected, the states' decisions like the federal de-
cisions hold ordinary price fixing agreements to be illegal.
2. Insofar as individual refusals to deal and group boycotts are
concerned, the state decisions, although not numerous, generally are con-
sistent with federal law.
3. The Texas courts have been particularly harsh in their treatment
of exclusive dealing contracts and exclusive territorial contracts. The law
in Texas contrasts quite sharply with the decisions in the other states and
with federal decisions where legality turns on purpose and effect.
4. None of the states have shown any interest in mergers, while
111. 108 Cal. 549, 41 Pac. 495 (1895).
112. 22 Tex. Civ. App. 118, 54 S.W. 289 (1899).
113. In re Consolidated Gas Co., 56 Misc. 49, 106 N.Y. 407 (Sup. Ct. 1907), aff'd, 124
App. Div. 401, 108 N.Y. Supp. 823 (1908).
114. People ex rel. Morse v. Nussbaum, 32 Misc. 1, 66 N.Y. Supp. 129 (Sup. Ct. 1900),
aff'd, 168 N.Y. 89, 61 N.E. 118 (1901).
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the federal government has shown a substantial interest in this practice
particularly during the past ten years.
5. Any substantial inconsistency between the state and federal anti-
trust decisions seems to stem primarily from the decisions in Texas,
particularly those dealing with exclusive dealing contracts and exclusive
territorial arrangements.
6. Activities considered illegal per se under the federal antitrust
laws have been held or undoubtedly would be found illegal under the
various state antitrust laws.
Is A UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST LAW DESIRABLE?
The renewed vigor which has been demonstarted by the various
state enforcement agencies, coupled with the multitude of state antitrust
statutes, brings into sharp focus the question of whether there should be
a uniform state antitrust law.
Any analysis of the problem must first start with a consideration of
the basic objectives of antitrust laws. It has been said that "antitrust is
a distinctive American means of assuring the competitive economy on
which our political and social freedom under representative government
in part depends.""' 5 The economy of the United States is one essentially
based upon the free enterprise system. Access to the market place and
the fostering of market rivalry are basic tenets of economic organiza-
tion. Antitrust is thus concerned with the promotion and protection of
competition as a matter of public policy.
Fundamentally, our basic antitrust policy, as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,"' rests on the prem-
ise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality, and the greatest material progress, while at the same time pro-
viding an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic
political and social institutions.
It is erroneous to say, however, that antitrust policy is oriented to-
ward a single goal. On the contrary, as Kaysen and Turner said:
Antitrust policy may serve a variety of ultimate aims. We can
divide the aims against which any policy proposal may be tested into
four broad classes: the attainment of desirable economic performance
by individual firms and ultimately by the economy as a whole; the
achievement and maintenance of competitive processes in the market-
regulated sector of the economy as an end in itself; the prescription of a
standard of business conduct, a code of fair competition; and the pre-
vention of an undue growth of big business, viewed broadly in terms
of the distributions of power in the society at large."17
115. Aarv GEN. NAVL COMM. AN.iTRusT REP. 2 (1955).
116. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
117. KAYsEN & TuRNER, ANTrRusr POLIcY 14 (1959).
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How best are these aims to be achieved? The answer to this might be
found in posing a threshold question. Is there a need for state antitrust
laws at all? As our study has indicated, most state statutes were enacted
years ago before expansion of the commerce power took place. Until
recent years, state antitrust laws have received little attention while, on
the other hand, federal law has been developing at an outstanding rate.
Its influence has been felt strongly in all walks of our economic life." 8
The scope of the federal law cannot be underestimated. It could be
said that the present pervasive application of federal law leaves little
reason for state antitrust laws; and that the instances in which state anti-
trust regulation will conflict with federal provisions will increase. Sev-
eral additional arguments also have been advanced for removing anti-
trust from the states. These arguments run somewhat as follows:
(1) The experience and capabilities of the federal judiciary and enforce-
ment agencies, developed during the period of state inactivity, suggests
that federal laws are better equipped to achieve the results that are being
sought; (2) the private treble damage does not suffer since a treble
damage action usually is available under the federal law no matter how
local the restraints; (3) the state can recover for damages to the public
under federal law; (4) exclusion of state control would eliminate the
problem of double penalties in dual prosecution." 9
We believe that reliance upon the pervasive scope of federal law as
a reason for abrogating state antitrust law is unfounded and ill-advised.
118. In recent years, the emphasis has moved from monopoly to mere attempt or intent to
monopolize; from domination of the market or power to control the market to "not an in-
substantial amount of commerce" or "any insignificant percentage of the business involved."
In the case of tie-in contracts, the standard of illegality is whether the seller "has sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition
in the market for the tied product," and that crucial economic power may be inferred from
the tying product's desirability to consumers, or from uniqueness in its attributes.
In the field of resale price maintenance, a seller may announce in advance a refusal to
deal with those persons who do not observe his suggested prices. But if the seller should go
beyond this mere announcement and employ other means which effect adherence to resale
prices, he has violated the law. These forbidden other means can take the form of soliciting
assurances from the customer or inducing wholesalers to cut off a price-cutting retailer.
And in the area of product pricing, a seller is now forbidden to reduce his price even to a
small customer to enable that customer to meet the competition of a price-cutting competitor,
irrespective of whether the poor customer eventually may be driven out of business; to do so
"would discourage rather than promote competition." The seller's only remedy in that in-
stance is to reduce his price equally to all competing dealers. A seller can take heart, how-
ever. "In cases in which the economic facts so indicate, carefully drawn area submarkets
may be the proper measure of competitive impact among purchasers." Federal Trade Comm.
v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 521 (1963).
Likewise, sales below cost without legitimate commercial objectives and with the intent
of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor violates § 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act. In a recent case, United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963), the
Supreme Court gave some examples of legitimate objectives "such as liquidation of excess,
obsolete or perishable merchandise, or the need to meet a lawfully equally low price of a
competitor."
119. See Comment, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1494-95 (1961), where the problems posed
by the renewed interest in state antitrust enforcement were reviewed.
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Although it is said that Congress used all of its power to reach restraints
affecting interstate commerce, 2' there are areas of restraints it did not
reach. Thus, in recent years, the Sherman Act has been held inapplica-
ble to situations involving a conspiracy to exclude competition in the
operation of local taxicabs;. 2 ' a combination of plastering contractors
and employees to allocate and monopolize plastering contracts in Chi-
cago;. 2 a price fixing combination of drive-in theatres; 3 and a com-
bination to drive a newspaper engaged in legal advertising out of busi-
ness.124
As one court recently observed:
However, despite the increased thrust of federal commerce power
as business operations become more interrelated and complex, the courts
have consistently required that in order for federal antitrust jurisdiction
to be sustained the effect on interstate commerce of an alleged anti-
trust violation in a local area must be direct and substantial, and not
merely inconsequential, remote or fortuitous. 125
There are numerous local activities which still are beyond the reach
of federal law; such as those involving the local rendition of services,
i.e., real estate brokers, dry cleaning establishments, building trades,
local printing, and the like. Moreover, even as to those cases which
theoretically are within the reach of federal law, federal agencies have
admitted that they cannot deal comprehensively with the problem. 2
The argument that federal courts and enforcement agencies are better
equipped to achieve the objectives of antitrust laws is not persuasive.
Whether the federal enforcement agencies have the expertise which
has been attributed to them is open to question. More important, how-
ever, there is a diversity of local economic conditions and business prob-
lems existing in many of the states, and the states are better equipped
to deal with local questions than are their federal counterparts.
The real deficiency in state antitrust law does not lie in inadequacy
or lack of expertise of the enforcement authorities, but in whether
the state really wants an antitrust law at all. As Professor Rahl recently
pointed out:
120. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
121. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
122. United States v. Employing Plasterers' Ass'n, 138 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. IMI. 1956), upon
remand from the Supreme Court, 347 U.S. 186 (1954).
123. United States v. Starlite Drive-In, Inc., 204 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1953).
124. Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961).
125. Id. at 332.
126. U.S. DEP'T OF JusncE, ANTITRUST BULL. No. 503, STATE ANTriRusT LAW REFER-
ENcE HAND-BooK 2 (1960).
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The most important suggestion may be made at the outset very
quickly. It is that for most of the states which now have a law, how-
ever antique it may be, a resolution of the legislature directing the
Attorney General to enforce it and appropriating some money for that
purpose would mean more than a carload of new substantive provisions.
For the basic deficiency now is not lack of an ideal statute, but lack of
a decision as to whether the state really wants any antitrust law at all.12 7
This is the real key to the problem. The authors believe that state
antitrust laws are desirable to carry out basic antitrust policy, that state
antitrust can form an integral part of overall antitrust policy, and that
federal law alone is not equal to the task.
This brings us back to the question initially propounded. Should
there be a uniform state antitrust act?
Analysis of the various statutes demonstrates that many of them use
antiquated language such as "pools" and "trusts," are verbose, and are
riddled with archaic passages. Nevertheless, to some degree there are
discernible common threads. Most of them outlaw price fixing, alloca-
tion of markets, limitation of production, group boycotts, and other com-
monly recognized anti-competitive restraints. The case law that has de-
veloped on these subjects has been surprisingly good overall and fairly
uniform in approach. These factors provide a sound basis or starting
point for a uniform law.
The authors believe that not only is there a need for a uniform law,
but that one would be desirable. At the moment, there are 153 state
statutes which can be characterized as antitrust in nature. Many of these
statutes deal with such complex economic issues as mergers, exclusive ar-
rangements, and price discriminations. The mistakes of federal laws
have been parroted in their state counterparts. Repeated again is the
strangulation of basic antitrust objectives by the soft competition concepts
espoused in the Robinson-Patman Act. The recent Hawaiian statute is
a striking example of this businessman's nightmare.
The renewed vitality of state antitrust enforcement already has begun
to develop inefficient duplication of effort by federal and state authori-
ties, with dual investigation and prosecution of the same persons for the
same acts.'12  The burden on the businessman will increase and he will
be required to operate at his peril, dependent upon the peculiarities of
various state statutes and the whims of enforcement officials.
Even more important, the basic objectives of antitrust law are in
serious danger of being frustrated, and our national economy may be
gravely affected if the states should turn their enforcement guns on com-
plex economic areas.
127. Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrast Policy, 39 TExAS L. Rsv. 753. 755
(1961).
128. State v. Southeast Tex. Chapter of Nat'l Elec. Contractor's Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d 711
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 969 (1963).
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The adoption of a uniform state antitrust act will abate these dangers.
Obviously, we cannot expect Utopia. The authors recognize that there
are inherent difficulties in a proposed uniform act of this nature. There
is the question of accommodation between federal and state authorities.
This is particularly difficult because of dual enforcement within the fed-
eral scheme by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission. This problem at least can be partially solved by close coopera-
tion between federal and state authorities in developing areas of prime
responsibility. Basic guidelines could be laid down. Cooperation be-
tween federal and state authorities already has been initiated within the
existing structure of the laws.'29 There is no reason why this could not
be expanded.
Another inherent difficulty is that of uniformity of enforcement and
approach. This question could be asked. How can a single law handle
widely varying conditions in some fifty states? The authors' analysis of
state antitrust decisions has demonstrated that this problem is more
theory than reality. It has been noted that there is no substantial incon-
sistency between state and federal antitrust decisions, except those deci-
sions emanating from the state of Texas relating to exclusive dealing and
exclusive territorial arrangements. There exists no reason why a simple
uniform law would change this pattern. Indeed, if the uniform law were
to exclude exclusive dealing and exclusive territorial arrangements - and
the authors urge that it do so - then the inconsistency which now exists
would be removed.
This raises the question as to what the uniform law should include.
In general, it is felt that the law should have as its main thesis the out-
lawing of the traditional per se type of offenses, i.e., price fixing, group
boycotts, allocation of markets, and production control. As to other
restraints, it should retain the flexibility of the rule of reason. It should
not include the types of offenses found in Clayton Act or Robinson-Pat-
man Act. The act should provide adequate investigatory and remedial
powers.
As to investigatory powers, it is felt that, at maximum, the uniform
act should provide a provision comparable to the federal civil investiga-
tive demand and limited to compelling the production of documents of
persons under investigation.
With respect to remedial powers, the authors recommended that:
(1) any provision dealing with forfeiture of the charter of a corporation
found to have violated the law be discretionary; (2) that it provide for
civil sanctions in lieu of criminal sanctions; and (3) that treble damages
to injured private persons be discretionary instead of mandatory.
129. See Sieker, State and Federal Relations in Antitrust Cases - Many Questions and Few
Answers, 9 N.Y.L.F. 199, 204-09 (1963).
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Within the above framework an effective state antitrust act can be
drafted, one that would remove the businessman's burden of compliance
with ambiguous, verbose statutes and inform him of the line of conduct
that is forbidden.
State antitrust law stands at a crossroad. It can assume a responsible
role in our federal system of government and become an integral part
of our overall antitrust policy, or it can proceed along the road of confu-
sion and darkness. It has the opportunity to benefit from the experience
of the past and to help shape the road of antitrust law for the future. As
Mr. Justice Holmes once said:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious . . . have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed. 130
To paraphrase the words of Holmes, antitrust law has had the ex-
perience of important segments of our economic life. It is time to take
advantage of that experience.
130. Holmes, Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 AM. L. REV. 608, 630 (1879).
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